Observations of Pre-operative Teamwork and Communication During the Implementation of a City-Wide Surgical Safety Checklist by Hansen, Terry Leonid et al.
Kansas Journal of Medicine 2012                                    City-Wide Surgical Safety Checklist  
117 
 
Observations of Pre-operative Teamwork and Communication  
During the Implementation of a City-Wide Surgical Safety Checklist 
Terry Leonid Hansen, M.D.
1
,  Kyle Goerl, M.D.
2
, Reginald Fears, M.D.
3
, Tim Nguyen, M.D.
4
, 
Traci Hart, Ph.D.
5
, Paul N. Uhlig, M.D.. M.P.A., F.A.C.S.
6 
1
University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences  
Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Little Rock, AR 
2
University of Utah Department of Family and Preventive Medicine, Salt Lake City, UT 
3
University of Kansas Medical Center  
Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Kansas City, KS 
4St. Mary’s Medical Center, San Francisco, CA 
5
Wichita State University Department of Psychology, Wichita, KS 
6
University of Kansas School of Medicine-Wichita Department of Anesthesiology, Wichita, KS 
 
Abstract 
Background. Use of the World Health Organization's (WHO) perioperative safety checklist has 
been shown in prior studies to reduce morbidity and mortality. In 2009, the Medical Society of 
Sedgwick County, Kansas, developed a modified version of the WHO checklist for city-wide 
implementation. This study evaluated how the checklist was used at a Wichita hospital. 
Methods. An observational tool was developed to evaluate time-outs at the beginning of surgical 
procedures. A convenience sample of cases was evaluated across surgical specialties and 
procedures. Observations included: 1) when the time-out was done, 2) who led the time-out, 3) 
which items on the checklist were addressed, 4) how much time was spent, and 5) whether 
problems were identified or adverse events prevented.   
Results. Data were collected from 121 observations. Only one of the surgical teams was 
observed to refer directly to the checklist posted in the OR to conduct their time out. The time-
out was done before induction (3%), drape (19%), incision (77%), and after incision (1%). The 
process was led by the circulating nurse (92%), surgeon (7%), and circulating nurse and surgeon 
together (1%). The percent of completed checklist items was: patient identity (96%), procedure 
(96%), antibiotics (87%), site (80%), allergies (75%), position (70%), equipment (60%), DVT 
prevention (50%), images (40%), surgeon concerns (36%), and anesthesia provider concerns 
(34%). On average, seven (SD = 2.5) of 11 items on the checklist were addressed. Time spent 
ranged from less than one minute to five minutes; 78% took one minute or less. Problems were 
identified in 7% of cases. In one case, a wrong site surgery was prevented.  
Conclusions. Despite the intention to implement a city-wide surgical safety checklist, the 
checklist rarely was used in its entirety to conduct the observed time-outs in the subject hospital. 
Although the checklist was under-utilized, safety benefits were observed from the time-out 
process. These would likely be enhanced and extended by consistent use of a checklist. 
KS J Med 2012; 5(4):117-133. 
 
 
Introduction 
Safety checklists have proven to be a 
valid and inexpensive cognitive aid to 
reduce human error and improve teamwork 
and communication.
1
 High reliability 
organizations such  as  the aviation industry,  
 
nuclear power industry, and military have 
long used checklists as a means of safety 
management. The exceptional safety record 
of the aviation industry owes much of its 
credit not to superior pilot skill, but to 
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reducing a complex process into a simplified 
series of checklists to ensure no steps are 
overlooked. For example, the early form of 
the pilot’s checklist accounted for the four 
key steps of flying an aircraft: 1) takeoff, 2) 
flight, 3) before landing, and 4) after the 
landing.
2
 This simple checklist reduced risks 
of operator error and minimized the impact 
of factors related to stress, fatigue, and 
memory in performing a complex task.
3
  
The safety checklist intervention is 
supported by human factors science and the 
systems-based approach.
4
 The systems 
approach emphasizes the importance of 
team functioning over individual operators. 
In the systems approach, the operator is not 
blamed for adverse events; rather the system 
is analyzed to determine the root cause of 
errors. After determining the events that led 
up to an error, defenses are built into the 
system to prevent recurrence of the previous 
error as well as future adverse events.
5
 Such 
an approach has the possibility of 
elucidating methods that could place the 
surgical profession on a performance 
trajectory that could achieve higher goals 
than may have been possible with the 
existing model. 
In 2008, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) published guidelines identifying 
multiple recommended practices to ensure 
the safety of surgical patients worldwide.
4
 
Key among those recommendations was the 
promotion of a surgical safety checklist. 
This checklist, evaluated by Haynes et al.
6
, 
concluded the WHO 19-item surgical safety 
checklist (see Figure 1; which includes 
“sign-in”, “time-out” and “sign-out” 
sections) decreased post-surgical compli-
cations, deaths, and surgical site infections 
for non-cardiac patients. The inpatient 
complication rate was 11% at baseline and 
fell to 7% after implementation (p < 0.001).
6
 
At baseline, the rate of death was 1.5% and 
fell to 0.8% afterward (p = 0.003).   
Approximately 20 million surgeries are 
performed in the US each year. Applying the 
mortality reduction observed in the WHO 
study to this figure, the total deaths related 
to surgical procedures could fall from about 
300,000 to 160,000. This translates into 
possibly 140,000 lives saved in the US 
yearly from the appropriate use of the 
checklist. This approximation is comparable 
to estimates presented in other studies. 
For many in the healthcare community, 
the checklist was heralded as a means to 
ensure a basic minimum safety standard.  
The surgical safety checklist process implies 
that every participant of the surgical team 
has a right and responsibility to 
communicate if they foresee or notice any 
errors or problems. Patients who are treated 
by teams that exhibit less communication 
are likely to have poorer outcomes.
8
 
Properly used, the checklist ensures that 
critical tasks are carried out and the team is 
prepared adequately for the operation.
9
   
Vats and colleagues
8
 found variability in 
the way the checklist was implemented 
noting the informal nature of its execution, 
unfamiliarity with the checklist among 
operating room (OR) staff, and uneven 
support from surgeons and anesthesiol-
ogists. Einav et al.
10
 suggested the use of 
large posters in the OR to guide team 
members in conducting the checklist. 
Posters also would serve a secondary 
purpose of reminding OR staff of 
commitment to the surgical safety process. 
Additionally, the checklist has been 
critiqued for not asking questions early 
enough to enable corrective action to be 
taken.
10
  Moreover, some OR teams used the 
checklist as a tool to ensure completion of a 
safety process whereas others treated it as a 
“tick box” exercise.9 Further critiques of the 
surgical safety checklist center on its 
inapplicability to all surgical specialties. For 
example, the checklist omitted many 
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Figure 1.  The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist (used with permission).
7 
 
important safety checks crucial to the safe 
conduct of cardiac operations such as checks 
on perfusion equipment and preparation for 
postoperative intensive care.
11
 Lastly, for all 
of its safety benefits, the checklist cannot 
identify and account for competency gaps.
12
 
Another factor that influences proper 
execution of the checklist is teamwork. 
When teamwork was optimized, the quantity 
and quality of preoperative briefings and 
team oriented behaviors increased.
8
 Finally, 
differences in outlook between clinicians 
and hospital administrators seemed to hinder 
attempts to introduce safety-related 
changes.
13
 The disparity in attitudes 
regarding safety between OR staff and 
administration propagates downstream to 
influence breakdown at the surgical level.
14
 
If adherence to the checklist is to be 
improved, it must be workable and 
acceptable to all staff. Creating a context 
where clinicians and managers work 
together is seen to lead to more success.
13
 
The surgical safety checklist, when backed 
up by good communication and training, 
results in a flexible yet resilient 
organization.
15
 
The WHO study
6
 evoked a wave of 
sentiment promoting the surgical safety 
checklist as a necessary component in the 
operating room. The Joint Commission (JC), 
the major accrediting body in the US, 
followed suit with the WHO and amended 
its own standards for a perioperative 
checklist. On July 1, 2004, the JC published, 
“The Joint Commission Universal Protocol 
for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong 
Procedure and Wrong Person Surgery”.16 
According to the Joint Commission’s 
Universal Protocol requirements for time-
out, the team members must confirm the 
correct patient identity, correct procedure, 
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and the correct operation site if applicable. 
The JC Universal Protocol check-
list addressed and augmented many of the 
areas covered by the first two stages of the 
WHO checklist (check-in and time-out).  
The Joint Commission supported the use of 
the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist, yet the 
current WHO checklist did not address the 
standards set forth in the Universal Protocol 
fully.
17
   
Due to impending further regulation 
from the JC, many surgical centers in the US 
adopted the use of some form of a surgical 
safety checklist. The Medical Society of 
Sedgwick County (MSSC) formed The 
Wichita Quality Healthcare Collaborative 
(TWQHC) in 2005 and began discussions on 
creating its own version of the WHO 
surgical safety checklist. The MSSC is a 
1210 member physician group in Wichita, 
Kansas, the largest metropolitan area in the 
state of Kansas. MSSC efforts to create a 
checklist also were hastened by impending 
Joint Commission (JC) regulations requiring 
a surgical safety checklist in the OR.  
TWQHC held several meetings at the 
MSSC which were attended by 
administrators and OR staff members 
representing the area’s major surgical 
centers. In March 2009, TWQHC introduced 
a 9-point consensus checklist to be used 
within OR time-outs at surgical centers in 
the greater Wichita area. Their consensus 
checklist is nearly identical to the WHO’s 
version of the checklist depicted in Figure 1.  
They concluded that the consensus checklist 
should be posted in each operating room and 
referred to by the OR team to conduct their 
pre-operative briefing. 
The surgical teams were advised to refer 
to the posted checklist each time and 
respond to the prompts with information 
read directly from the patient chart. In 
addition to the JC’s requirement to verify 
patient, procedure, and operation site, 
TWQHC’s checklist also complied with the 
JC’s intent to “ensure that all relevant 
documents are available and have been 
reviewed, as well as ensuring blood 
products, implants, and special equipment 
are available prior to the start of the 
procedure and accurately matched to the 
patient.”18 The observers in this study were 
tasked with evaluating the manner and 
consistency with which the pre-procedure 
safety verification process was performed 
and inclusive of the required components. 
The primary objectives of this study 
were to: 1) provide observational data 
regarding OR time-outs while executing the 
perioperative checklist approved by the 
Wichita Quality Health Collaborative, 2) 
discuss the behaviors exhibited by the 
observed surgical team members and the 
possible impact on safety outcomes, 3) 
suggest that the perioperative checklist 
represents a cultural paradigm shift that may 
redefine the roles of team members 
regarding surgical safety. 
It was hypothesized that the implement-
ation of the checklist might fail to elicit 
complete compliance across the observed 
surgical teams. The full utilization of the 
surgical safety checklist will require a shift 
in cultural paradigms; one that replaces the 
physician-centric culture with a systems-
based, collaborative approach. 
 
Methods 
Intervention. The MSSC began forming 
The Wichita Quality Healthcare Collabor-
ative in 2005 shortly after The Joint 
Commission’s “Universal Protocol for 
Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure 
and Wrong Person Surgery” became 
effective on July 1, 2004. During a series of 
conferences at the MSSC, a committee made 
up of surgical staff and administrators 
developed a consensus form of a pre-
operative checklist. TWQHC officially 
recommended their checklist for use in 
operating rooms in the Wichita area in 
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March, 2009. It was presented and promoted 
in the months prior at the subject facility, 
during OR staff meetings and hospital 
quality improvement meetings. The data 
collection process began in April, 2009. All 
time-outs that were observed in this study 
occurred weeks after the checklist had been 
officially implemented at the subject facility.   
The TWQHC consensus checklist 
addresses nine discrete items. One of these 
items was “special concerns” referring to the 
whole team. This item was expanded in our 
observation tool to record role-specific 
concerns from the surgeon, nurses, and 
anesthetist. Expanding this item resulted in 
the 11 measured checklist items referred to 
in the sections below. 
Subjects. One hundred and twenty one 
observations were conducted at one major 
medical center in Sedgwick County, Kansas. 
A random sample of cases was evaluated, 
between April 2009 and March 2010, across 
surgical specialties and procedures. This 
study received scientific review and was 
approved by the Institutional Review Board. 
Procedures.   Study    personnel    arrived 
prior to the posted surgical start to be in 
place and capture, by audio recording, the 
entirety of the event being observed, 
specifically, the surgical time-out which 
includes the pre-operative safety checklist 
(see Appendix). During the observational 
period, the study personnel collected data on 
the observation tool.  
The observer captured, by audio 
recording, the entirety of the time-out 
process and pre-operative safety briefing. 
During data analysis, the study personnel 
played back the recorded audio to clarify 
what was verbalized within the pre-
operative briefing. Upon completion of the 
observation tool, the audio recording was 
erased from the device’s memory per 
approved study protocol. No attempt was 
made to mark or save any audio recordings. 
Data elements included a table for OR staff 
presence and participation, the checklist 
items, when and how the time-out was 
conducted, and space for open-ended 
comments (e.g., concerns being verbalized, 
“problem solving” responses, and dissenting 
opinions section on the consensus checklist). 
Four fourth-year medical students were 
trained to use the data collection tool. 
Initially, they trained with video-recorded 
pre-operative briefings that used a safety 
checklist (found at www.scoap.org and 
www.safesurg.org). Then, two study 
personnel would attend live observations of 
pre-operative briefings together until their 
inter-rater reliability exceeded kappa ≥ 0.8.   
 
Results 
A total of 123 surgical briefings were 
attended during the course of this study. 
However, two of the briefings began before 
induction of anesthesia, therefore, the data 
could not be applied due to IRB protocol 
restrictions. Additionally, 25 observations 
were conducted using the wrong version of 
the data collection tool and only partial data 
was retained for analysis.     
Observations were conducted at all times 
throughout the day. However, the most 
convenient and predictable time was during 
the first round of operations in a given day. 
The surgical time-out began when the 
initiator, typically the circulator nurse, asked 
the team if they were ready to start the 
briefing. The circulator typically read the 
patient’s name first, followed by the 
intended procedure, and continued with 
some combination of the remaining safety 
checklist items. Most observations lasted 
less than five minutes, but observers 
typically were present in the operating room 
several minutes before the time-out was 
initiated. 
In one of the 121 eligible evaluations, 
the checklist posted in the room was referred 
to specifically during the pre-operative time-
out. The other 120 teams did not read from 
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nor verbally acknowledge the checklist 
posted in the OR during the briefing. The 
items on the checklist were addressed in 
their entirety in 12 out of 121 (10.0%) time-
outs. In two instances (1.7%), a safety time 
out was not done at all, violating the Joint 
Commission’s standard. 
The average number of items completed 
on the observation tool checklist was 6.6 of 
11 (Std Dev 2.4).  The percentage for the 
number of items completed on the checklists 
is shown in Figure 2. The completion 
percentage of each item on the 11 point 
checklist is shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 2.  The percentage for the number of items completed on the checklists. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Percentage of checklist items performed. 
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Timing of time-out and checklist 
performance by percentage is shown in 
Figure 4. The circulating nurse performed 
the checklist 92.5% of the time, and the lead 
surgeon 7.5% of the time. Eighty-four 
percent (83.5%) of the time the time-out was 
performed in less than 3 minutes, and in 
69.4% of the cases, it was one minute or 
less. In 20 observations (16.5%), the 
checklist took longer than five minutes to 
complete. Attendance and introduction 
during the time-out were variable: 
circulating nurse (attended 100%, 
introduced 0%), attending surgeon (attended 
97.5%, introduced 4.2%), scrub nurse 
(attended 97.5%, introduced 0%), certified 
registered nurse anesthetists (attended 
90.1%, introduced 0%), and the 
anesthesiologist (attended 35.5%, introduced 
0%). The observations of verbal responses 
by team members are in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Timing of time-out and checklist performance by percentage.
During the time-out, the leader failed to 
engage the operating staff members directly 
in 33.3% of cases. “Alternatives to the 
standard procedure,” and “problems” were 
identified in 2.5% and 6.6% of cases 
respectively, but in one case the “problem” 
identified was that a wrong-sided body part 
was marked. In one case (0.8%), the surgeon 
verbalized that the operative room was a 
“safe environment” to voice concerns during 
the procedure. 
 
Discussion 
The data showed that despite 
recommendations from the hospital 
administration, the checklist as a whole was 
utilized rarely during the pre-operative 
briefing. The eleven items that we evaluated 
were addressed fully in only 10% of the pre-
operative briefings. In all but one case, the 
surgical team failed to utilize the posted 
checklist in the OR and confirm each of the 
nine items listed there. The tasks completed
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Table 1. Summary of verbal observations. 
Observation Topic Team Comments (as noted by observers) 
Problems identified. 1. Clarification/uncertainty of a medicine allergy. 
2. Identification of a missing item needed for the procedure. 
3. Confusion by anesthesia over whether or not heparin was given. 
4. Noted the patient as hypothyroid. 
5. Additional antibiotic requested. 
6. Noted by circular nurse that the patient was unsure about their 
allergies.  
7. Noted that the surgeon asked for patient to be given more 
cefotetan (antibiotic). 
8. Operative procedure reviewed. 
Changes made to 
technology or 
approach. 
1. Wrong side of patient initially marked for surgery. 
2. Cell saver requested by surgeon. 
3. Hemavac and nylon suture requested by surgeon. 
4. Decision made about mesh. 
Action taken on 
missing items. 
1. Missing item was located and brought to surgery. 
2. Placed sequential compression devise. 
3. Missing port kit needed for surgery. 
4. Placed Foley catheter. 
Clarifications requested 
on specific items. 
1. Circulator nurse asked the surgeon, “Do you want the large or 
small size attachment?” It was verbally resolved by the surgeon. 
2. Anesthesiologist asked the surgeon, “Do you want another dose 
of antibiotics?” It was verbally resolved. 
3. Circulator asked the surgeon for clarification of the procedure. 
The surgeon responded verbally. 
4. Surgeon asked OR staff, “What could have been done better in 
our time out process?” Time out was repeated. 
5. CRNA asked the anesthesiologist, “Shall I replace the 
scopolamine path.” The answer was, “Yes replace it.” 
6. Circulator nurse asked surgeon for procedure clarification. The 
surgeon clarified the procedure. 
7. Surgeon asked CRNA, “Were antibiotics given?” CRNA replied 
“Yes.” 
8. Surgeon asked CRNA, “Do you want Ancef or cefotetan?” and 
replied, “Cefotetan.” 
9. Surgeon asked circular nurse, “Do we have a Foley in?” 
Circulator nurse replied, “Will put Foley in.” 
10. Scrub nurse asked circulator nurse, “Can you get disposable 
graspers?” Circulator nurse answered, “OK.” 
11. Surgeon asked CRNA, “Were antibiotics given?” CRNA 
answered, “Ancef given at 1449.” 
12. Surgeon asked scrub nurse, “Do we have a port 2 access site 
kit?” Scrub nurse went to retrieve. 
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13. Circulator nurse asked CRNA, “Were antibiotics given?” CRNA 
answered, “Yes, 2 g of Ancef were given at 0748.” 
14. Surgeon asked circulator nurse, “Do we have a cell saver?” 
Nurse obtained cell saver. 
15. Circulator nurse asked CRNA, “Did you give Amp and Gent? 
What time?” CRNA answered, “Amp given at 0718. Gent given 
now.” 
16. Circulator nurse asked CRNA, “Were antibiotics given?” CRNA 
answered, “Yes, 2 g of Ancef were given.” 
17. Surgeon asked anesthesiologist, “Were antibiotics given?” 
Answered, “Yes, vancomycin was given.” 
18. Surgeon asked CRNA, “Were antibiotics given?” CRNA 
answered, “Ancef was given.” 
19. Surgeon asked circulator nurse, “Did you get her pics (images) 
up?” Circulator nurse replied, “I will put them up.” 
20. Circulator nurse asked anesthesiologist, “Were antibiotics 
given?” Answered, “1 g of cefotetan at 1351.” 
21. Surgeon asked CRNA, “Do you want antibiotics?” CRNA 
answered, “She’s probably on orals on the floor.” 
22. Surgeon asked circulator nurse, “Does she have a Foley?” CRNA 
responded, “No. I will insert Foley.” 
23. Surgeon asked CRNA, “Did she get antibiotics?” “Yes, 1 g of 
cefotetan.” 
24. Surgeon asked circulator nurse, “Does she have SCDS or DVT 
prophylaxis?” Circulator nurse replied, “Yes, SCDS.” 
25. CRNA asked surgeon, “Do you want antibiotics?” Surgeon said, 
“Give Ancef.” 
26. CRNA asked surgeon, “What antibiotics do you want?” Surgeon 
answered, “Giving 2 g Ancef at 0735.” 
27. Circulator nurse asked surgeon, “What do you want the 
tourniquet set on?” Surgeon replied, “Set at 300.” 
28. Scrub nurse asked circulator nurse, “Does he like to use this 
reciprocator?” Circulator nurse answered, “Yes, that one is what 
he uses.” 
29. Surgeon asked CRNA, “Were antibiotics given?” Answered, 
“Yes.” 
30. Circulator nurse asked the anesthesiologist, “Were antibiotics 
given?” Answered, “Yes. Antibiotics were given.” 
31. Circulator nurse asked surgeon for clarification of procedure 
terminology. It was clarified by the surgeon. 
 
 
Kansas Journal of Medicine 2012                                    City-Wide Surgical Safety Checklist  
 
126 
 
with the most consistency were confirmation 
of patient identity and procedure. One 
possible explanation is that OR teams were 
generally quite familiar with these particular 
tasks due to the JC’s mandate (prompting 
verification the correct patient, procedure, 
and operating site), effective July 1, 2004,
18
 
nearly five years prior to the implementation 
of TWQHC’s checklist. While surgical 
teams were advised to refer directly to the 
posted checklist, this behavior was noted in 
only one case out of 121. The low 
completion rate of the safety checklist (10%) 
showed that the teams’ execution of the 
checklist did not meet the standards set by 
their peers and administrators at the medical 
society meetings.  
The JC recommended that, when 
possible, the patient should be involved in 
the verification process.
19
 The patient was 
sedated fully during each of 121 valid time-
out observations. Two of the original 123 
observations were invalidated by an IRB 
condition that the patient be unaware of the 
observer. From a human factors perspective, 
including the patient in the verification 
process tends to add to the reliability of the 
safety briefing. In 73.6% of cases, the time-
out was before incision. This means the 
patient had been sedated deeply, prepped, 
and draped. Completing the time-out at that 
particular juncture bypasses some critical 
points where errors can occur. For instance, 
it is possible that the wrong patient could be 
present or the incorrect side may have been 
prepped, and the team may not become 
aware of this until just before incision. 
Although we were not able to evaluate the 
briefings in which the patient was included, 
doing so diminishes the risk of patient 
misidentification. 
Benefits of the safety checklists may 
include: 1) reducing human error, 2) 
prompting human interaction, and 3) 
developing team identity.
20
 Surgical teams 
navigate many layers of complexity on a 
daily basis. A systems approach is 
advocated to deal with this high level of 
complexity and ultimately curb the effect of 
human error on patient outcomes.
5
 The 
safety checklist, if used as intended, clearly 
falls within the systems approach.  
Less clear is what type of human 
interaction is stimulated by the use of the 
safety checklist. Our study found that in 
33.6% of the observations the initiator/ 
leader of the briefing, typically the circu-
lating nurse, did not direct verbal prompts 
toward any particular staff member. In other 
words, they did not demand or maintain the 
full attention of any one particular staff 
member. A study by Mazzocco et al.
8
 found 
that lack of communication and team 
functioning placed patients at a higher risk 
for death or complications, even after 
adjusting for the American Society of 
Anesthesiologists risk category. The time-
out checklist, in its intended use, causes the 
entire team to stop their individual activities 
and focus together on the primary collective 
task, verifying a safe and appropriate 
surgical environment. 
The complexity of safety concerns 
surrounding any one operation are worthy of 
the undivided attention of all surgical team 
members. In “The Universal Protocol for 
Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, 
and Wrong Person Surgery”, the Joint 
Commission stated that during the 
performance of a time-out “all relevant 
members of the procedure team [should] 
actively communicate during the time-
out”.19 Surgical staff may need to employ 
communication skills, distinct from their 
technical expertise, to ensure that this 
behavior occurs reliably.
21,22
 
In this study, the anesthesiologist was 
absent for most of the time-outs. Given that 
they were ultimately responsible for critical 
elements that dictate patient vitality (e.g., 
airway, breathing, and circulation), their 
presence at the patient safety briefing is 
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important. A failure to appreciate expressed 
concerns regarding patient safety issues 
discussed during a time-out may delay or 
impede proper action in emergency 
situations. The observed surgical depart-
ment’s policy requires that all nurse 
anesthetists (CRNAs) be supervised by a 
physician anesthetist. Anesthesiologists are 
not required to attend time-out briefings 
explicitly for cases staffed by CRNAs.  
However, we recommend that they do so, 
for the very reason that they are required to 
supervise at all, to ensure that the patient 
receives the highest quality care possible. In 
fairness, a single anesthesiologist may be 
responsible for supervising up to three cases 
at once, which makes it challenging to avail 
them at each briefing. Safety measures can 
be implemented and supported by actions at 
various levels of administration. Ensuring 
that the anesthesiologist is present at each 
briefing may require action on the part of the 
administrators who determine how each case 
is scheduled and staffed. 
Often in medical practice, time 
limitations are an issue. This fact may be a 
source of resistance to the implementation of 
any safety checklist measures that increase 
the time commitments of an already 
overburdened staff. However, the safety 
checklist has a minimal time commitment; 
83.5% of the briefings took three minutes or 
less. Within that relatively short time, 
several critical items can be clarified. Some 
issues discussed in the safety checklist, if 
not addressed properly, can cause significant 
harm to patients. For example, the issue of 
deep venous thrombosis (DVT) is a 
considerable risk in the surgical population. 
In one study, the incidence of DVTs was 
3.7% of all adverse events, and 18% of those 
were preventable.
23
 Our study showed that 
DVT prophylaxis was confirmed in only 
41.4% of briefings. Additionally, site 
infections are a major contributor to patient 
morbidity and mortality. The effectiveness 
of antibiotic administration shortly before 
skin incision to prevent surgical site 
infections has been established since the 
1960’s and has been applied widely in 
surgical operations.
24
 Our study observed 
that antibiotic prophylaxis was confirmed in 
only 86.9% of pre-operative briefings. 
Although the checklist was under-
utilized, safety benefits were observed from 
the time-out process. In one observed case, 
the use of the checklist exposed that the 
wrong site had been marked prior to the 
time-out. Had this error persisted, a sentinel 
event may have occurred in the form of a 
wrong-site surgery. Other problems ident-
ified during time-out discussions, were 
uncertainty about patient’s allergies, missing 
equipment, and the discovery that additional 
antibiotics were necessary. Failure to detect 
and address the aforementioned issues could 
have resulted in needless harm to patients. 
Study limitations. The study was con-
ducted at one Wichita area hospital.  Results 
might have been different had other sites 
where the MSSC checklist was in use were 
added. The procedures were selected by 
convenience and many of the observations 
were conducted early in the morning when 
start times were more predictable. Perhaps, 
some services were under-represented if 
they were scheduled routinely for afternoon 
start times.  
The observations were completed over a 
relatively short period. Therefore, a shift in 
behavior over time could not be measured 
reliably. Two observers went off protocol 
and did not use a recording device 
consistently. However, the briefings were 
relatively short and predictable and there 
was little effect on the validity of the 
observations. Furthermore, the majority of 
the items registered by the observers were 
purely objective.  
More subjective data from individuals 
who use the checklist would provide further 
insight into the behavioral factors that 
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dictate its use. To include patient 
participation, signed informed consent 
would have been required prior to observing 
the briefing. We concluded prior to the study 
that the patient consent process itself would 
have signaled our observation to the OR 
staff in a manner that causes them to 
consciously change their behavior. This 
change in behavior would have exacerbated 
the Hawthorne effect (i.e., when participants 
alter their behavior as a result of being part 
of an experiment or study), which we 
reasoned was substantial in this study. As a 
result, the utilization of the surgical safety 
checklist may have been, in reality, lower 
than observed. 
 
Conclusions 
Based on the observed resistance to the 
safety checklist, a culture change or 
paradigm shift is necessary to realize the 
highest possibilities for patient safety. The 
existing paradigm is one that Atul Gawande 
refers to as the “Master Builder/Master 
Physician” model.24 Dating back to 
medieval times, buildings were constructed 
by a master builder who designed, 
engineered, and oversaw construction of 
every aspect of the project from start to 
finish. Gawande likened this to the existing 
culture in healthcare which is traditionally 
physician-centric, generally regarding other 
providers as ancillary. Full utilization of the 
safety checklist requires a shift to a systems-
based model rooted in human factors 
science.  
Paradigm shifts are healthy in science 
because they challenge us to develop and 
implement models that better deal with 
reality. Thomas Kuhn, a well-known 
scientific historian, stated that the new 
model must seem to resolve some 
outstanding and generally recognized 
problem that can be met in no other way.
25
 It 
also must solve more problems than its 
predecessor while preserving “a relatively 
large part of the concrete problem solving 
activity that has accrued to science through 
its predecessors." The systems-based model 
fits Kuhn’s description of a revolutionary 
paradigm. It addresses the global concern 
about improving patient safety. It better 
addresses the problems of morbidity and 
mortality in surgical practice through the use 
of the safety checklist.
6
 Finally, it preserves 
our evidence-based clinical methods and 
confirms that our clinical acumen is applied 
fully in the care of each patient. 
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Appendix 
The Pre-Operative Briefing Observation Tool 
 
Date: ________________________________   Observer Name: ___________________________ 
Position Circulating 
Nurse 
Surgeon Assistant 
Surgeon 
or 
PA/RNFA 
Anesthesiologist CRNA Scrub 
Nurse 
Assistant 
Scrub 
Nurse 
Patient Other 
Personnel 
Attendance  
@ time-out:  
P = Present, L = Late,  
A = Absent, or N/A 
         
Introduction  
@ time-out 
I = Introduced     
S = Self-identified 
N = Not Identified  
N/A = Not Available 
         
L = Lead during 
briefing 
N/A = Did not lead 
         
Person verbalized an 
unusual/ 
unpredictable concern 
or event 
(N/A if not applicable) 
         
Person gives a 
“problem solving” 
response (N/A if not 
applicable) 
         
Person expressed 
dissenting opinion or 
frustration w/ checklist 
(N/A if not applicable) 
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I. During Time-out Briefing:        Start Time:                                       End time:                          . 
1. Checklist was done     Before Induction of Anesthesia     Before Prep and Drape     Before Incision     After Incision     
Not Done 
2. To whom did the leader direct the checklist questioning?   Patient    OR Staff Member   Not Centered/Directed 
3. Did the team address every point of the checklist?      NO       YES     (See checklist) 
4. Did anyone add some points to the list?      NO       YES, please explain: 
 
 
5. Were any problems identified due directly to a prompt from the checklist?      NA (if checklist not done)     NO     YES, 
please explain: 
 
 
Surgical Checklist for Time-Out: 
Confirm the patient’s: 
Y   N  Identity          Y   N  Procedure          Y   N  Surgical site          Y   N  Position 
 
Y  N  Confirms that all essential imaging results for the correct patient are displayed in the 
operating room 
 
Y  N  Confirms that prophylactic antibiotics have been administered < 60 min before incision is 
made or that antibiotics are not indicated 
 
Y  N  Surgeon reviews critical and unexpected steps, operative duration, and anticipated blood 
loss 
 
Y  N  Anesthesia staff review concerns specific to patient 
 
Y  N  Nursing staff review confirmation of sterility, equipment availability, and other concerns 
 
Y  N  Patient allergies read from chart 
 
Y  N  Verbally considered DVT prophylaxis 
Circle if observer heard these words 
 
We 
 
Us 
 
Our 
 
Team 
 
Together 
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6. Were any last minute changes made to technology or approach from using the checklist?     NA (if checklist not done)      
 NO     YES, please explain: 
 
 
7. Was action taken on any missing items?      NA      NO     YES, please explain: 
 
 
8. Did a discussion of alternatives to the standard procedure arise because of the checklist?      NA (if checklist not done)     
 NO     YES, please explain: 
 
 
9. Was a planned technician switch-out verbalized during time-out?      NO     YES  
10. Who is invoked for clarification of a specific matter? 
Question To From Resolution 
    
    
    
11. Is anyone who verbalizes a problem discouraged or reprimanded?   NA      
 NO       
YES      
Proponent:: Resistor:  Explain: 
 NO       
YES      
Proponent:: Resistor:  Explain: 
 NO       
YES      
Proponent:: Resistor:  Explain: 
12. Was it ever verbalized that the environment is safe for alternate constructive opinions?       NO     YES, please explain: 
 
 
